Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian)
This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers--a man generally regarded as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century." Liddell Hart stressed movement, flexibilty, surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance is prelude to victory. This dislocation results from a strategic indirect approach. Reflect for a moment on the results of direct confrontation (trench war in WW I) versus indirect dislocation (Blitzkreig in WW II). Liddell Hart is also tonic for business and political planning: just change the vocabulary and his concepts fit. "The most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time." (Library Journal)
Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian) Accessories
Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian) Reviews
Some reviewers have criticized author Liddell Hart for being heavy handed in his support for the indirect approach. Hart, a British World War 1 vet, understandably would advocate anything but the direct approach given his experiences of the horrors of WW1. There was a grave shortage of finess in that War.
Hart gives his props to Sun Tzu (Art of War) and does not claim to have invented the concept of the indirect strategy. He does use 25 centuries of warfare to demonstrate why it is the most effective option available to military commanders. Also of interest, Hart gives no mention of his peer and main contributor to modern tank warfare, JC Fuller. Others who advanced these ideas of mobile modern warfare also fail to get credit - Guderian, Chaffee (US Army) don't make the list.
However, Hart's analysis of the impact of nuclear weapons and guerrilla war are very insightful and applicable to 2010 as much as they were when written back in 1949. If one thinks Hart emphasizes the indirect approach too much, why do so many commanders fail to use it? History has shown the usefulness of putting the enemy on "the horns of a dilemna" (W.T. Sherman, USA)time and time again.
I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in strategy, the history of warfare. It has not outlived its relevancy, in fact, given today's struggles against terrorism, it is all the more important since these are the very tactics being used against the West. I've studied history for over 35 years and have yet to find fault with the theories of the indirect approach.
Liddell-Hart's Strategy attempts to show the power of the so-called indirect approach in warfare, as well as the futility of the frontal, direct approach. Sadly, its presentation is extremely biased and flawed.
The book is dominated by a historical overview of nearly every war fought in the western world, with an in-depth focus on the World Wars. The overview is truly detailed in the wars and battles it covers, from Marathon to Remagen (though the American Revolution is conspicuous in its absence). Sadly, the way those wars and battles are covered is not as detailed.
Liddell-Hart is obviously biased towards the superiority of the indirect approach, and it shows in his descriptions of the battles and wars in his overview. Campaigns that involved an indirect approach are examined in great detail, while direct campaigns and wars are dismissed in a few paragraphs, often brushed away as "indecisive" (The best example is the Russo-Japanese War, which certainly was decisive) without explaining why they were indecisive. Even his descriptions of indirect campaigns do not contain nearly enough information to enable one to truly make one's mind up on the battles, regardless of opinion, leaving one with little choice but to take Liddell-Hart's word for it.
Not only does Liddell-Hart marginalize campaigns dominated by the direct approach, but he also oversimplifies and leaves many details that contradict his views out. The book's description of the American Civil War is an excellent example of this biased reporting. Besides vilifying Grant for following a direct approach and glorifying Sherman for using an indirect one, Liddell-Hart simply leaves out many indirect approaches that failed, from Hood's Franklin-Nashville campaign to the many flank offensives that Grant planned as part of his grand campaign, like Butler's failed Bermuda Hundred landing.
Another example of Liddell-Hart's bias is his coverage of the Guadalcanal campaign-or lack of it. The six-month campaign that turned the offensive tide in the Pacific is covered in only two sentences: "In August 1942, General MacArthur's opening move was made against Guadalcanal--the most southerly, and nearest, of the Solomon Islands. The reconquest of Guadalcanal took six months." Besides containing a factual error (Guadalcanal was planned for by Admiral Ernest King, not MacArthur), the description seeks to show the folly of the direct approach-that taking a small island with the direct approach took six months, in contrast to the rapid advance gained by island hopping.
What it does not mention is that at the time of the campaign, the Japanese possessed greater naval strength in the Pacific, and that during those six months, that naval strength (particularly its skilled aviators), was reduced by the bloody, direct battles in and around Ironbottom Sound. It also does not mention that the climax of the land campaign in late October was dominated by a Japanese attempt at an indirect approach that succeeded in misdirecting the Americans, but still failed miserably due to poor logistics, command, and the firepower and determination of the American defenders. Far from showing the folly of the direct approach, the Guadalcanal campaign shows how a bold and well-executed direct approach can be decisive.
Strategy also suffers from lopsided coverage of certain campaigns. Eighteen pages are devoted to Rommel's North Africa campaign, while only five are devoted to the entire Pacific theater throughout the war, to give just one example. The last quarter of the book is devoted to the "Theory of Strategy". This is not as interesting as the historical section, and essentially just repeats Sun Tzu while bashing Clausewitz.
Though its premise that indirect maneuver is preferable to direct frontal attacks is one that I agree with and that few would dispute, Strategy is nonetheless a biased and flawed history book. I cannot recommend it.
Never give a sucker an even break. Why attack the enemy head-on and try and force your way towards an objective that will become so obvious that it will across all the enemies reserves to further block your way? Why not confuse, demoralise and set the enemy up for easy defeat by taking unpredictable indirect approaches?
This timeless classic is in two parts.
The first part is analysis of over 200 military battles across all ages of history to show that head on military attacks rarely succeed. I found that to cover all these battles, the analysis was so limited and brief, and maps often lacking detail, that much of it didnt mean anything. Luckily I had read about many of these battles previously and could follow on, but I reckon this section could bore and lose many people.
The second part is the great bit that makes this book a classic that should be read all high level military and defence politicians - luckily for them its also the shorter bit! It looks at the definitions of peace and strategy and concludes that the aim of war is 'to provide a better peace'. How many times has a winning side suffered so badly that it was worse off also in absolute terms than before the war? Often there are better ways to build a constructive long term peace (for everyone) if war was not simply seen as a race to crush your opponent in a climatic battle. Taking the 'indirect approach' can not only allow that better peace but by avoiding the bloody battles it saves lives on both sides - a surprisingly humane touch for such the cold subject of military strategy. His analysis of the overbearing effect of Clausewitz on modern strategy in seeking the climatic battle was thought provoking.
A good read for strategic thinkers and wargammers - if you get stuck on the first part of the book, then read the second bit on theory of strategy. You can then use the index to chase up the pages of the various battles he uses in support of his arguments, if you want that extra historical detial
regards and happy reading
david
In this classic study of strategy, B.H. Liddell Hart makes clear that he is concerned with military strategy. He is careful to distinguish this from `grand' or what he calls `policy' strategy designed to achieve broader national security goals. He specifically focuses on military strategy to achieve military ground force goals. To develop his concept of military strategy, Hart engaged in an extensive analysis of military conflict from ancient times through WWII from which he concluded that all the most successful military strategies were based three pillars: careful pre-planning; effective execution; and, most importantly, the "indirect approach." By indirect approach Hart means avoiding frontal assaults, obvious lines of advance, and obvious objectives. He is a strong advocate of disrupting enemy communications, planning, and command structures by means of unanticipated lines of attack and unique distribution of forces. As an afterthought to the revised addition of this book, Hart has included a quite good chapter on guerrilla warfare which could be usefully read today by counter-insurgency folks. Rather interestingly, Hart implies that air force and naval operations although often incorporated in ground force strategic implementations are more usually integral to grand strategies than to military strategy.
Hart, who died in 1970, has always been a controversial, but undoubted military authority. One can legitimately ask did Hart develop his concept of the indirect approach strategy from his analysis of history or did he develop the concept first and then used his study of history to prove it? Well in point of fact it scarcely matters. This is an original book that is an important addition to the study of military strategy. It is as relevant today as it was when Hart revised it.
Though I am not sold on Liddell Hart's thesis in this book, it provides such an expansive analysis of historical military accounts that I cannot discount its indelible mark on my future thoughts of military strategy. Clausewitz puts me to sleep, but Liddell Hart kept me awake into the wee hours of the morning. This is recommended to anyone seeking even a minimum knowledge in military strategy. Strapped for time? Read the introductory chapters and skip to the final chapters where Liddell Hart expounds upon his thesis (having spent the majority of the book providing countless analyses of historical examples).
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