Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian)
This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers--a man generally regarded as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century." Liddell Hart stressed movement, flexibilty, surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance is prelude to victory. This dislocation results from a strategic indirect approach. Reflect for a moment on the results of direct confrontation (trench war in WW I) versus indirect dislocation (Blitzkreig in WW II). Liddell Hart is also tonic for business and political planning: just change the vocabulary and his concepts fit. "The most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time." (Library Journal)
Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian) Accessories
 On War (Oxford World's Classics)
The Art of War (Shambhala classics)
Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
Roots of Strategy Book: 4 Military Classics : The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Command of the Air, Winged Defense
The Art of War by Mao Tse-Tung - Special Edition
On War
On Guerrilla Warfare
The Prince (Bantam Classics)
Roots of Strategy: The 5 Greatest Military Classics of All Time (Bk. 1)
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian) Reviews
His analysis of the overbearing effect of Clausewitz on modern strategy in seeking the climatic battle was thought provoking. Why attack the enemy head-on and try and force your way towards an objective that will become so obvious that it will across all the enemies reserves to further block your way. This timeless classic is in two parts. david regards and happy reading. Often there are better ways to build a constructive long term peace (for everyone) if war was not simply seen as a race to crush your opponent in a climatic battle.
Never give a sucker an even break. I found that to cover all these battles, the analysis was so limited and brief, and maps often lacking detail, that much of it didnt mean anything. The first part is analysis of over 200 military battles across all ages of history to show that head on military attacks rarely succeed. You can then use the index to chase up the pages of the various battles he uses in support of his arguments, if you want that extra historical detial. Luckily I had read about many of these battles previously and could follow on, but I reckon this section could bore and lose many people.
It looks at the definitions of peace and strategy and concludes that the aim of war is 'to provide a better peace'. Why not confuse, demoralise and set the enemy up for easy defeat by taking unpredictable indirect approaches. Taking the 'indirect approach' can not only allow that better peace but by avoiding the bloody battles it saves lives on both sides - a surprisingly humane touch for such the cold subject of military strategy. How many times has a winning side suffered so badly that it was worse off also in absolute terms than before the war. The second part is the great bit that makes this book a classic that should be read all high level military and defence politicians - luckily for them its also the shorter bit.
A good read for strategic thinkers and wargammers - if you get stuck on the first part of the book, then read the second bit on theory of strategy.
As an afterthought to the revised addition of this book, Hart has included a quite good chapter on guerrilla warfare which could be usefully read today by counter-insurgency folks. This is an original book that is an important addition to the study of military strategy. Hart, who died in 1970, has always been a controversial, but undoubted military authority. Well in point of fact it scarcely matters. Liddell Hart makes clear that he is concerned with military strategy. He is careful to distinguish this from `grand' or what he calls `policy' strategy designed to achieve broader national security goals.
To develop his concept of military strategy, Hart engaged in an extensive analysis of military conflict from ancient times through WWII from which he concluded that all the most successful military strategies were based three pillars: careful pre-planning; effective execution; and, most importantly, the "indirect approach." By indirect approach Hart means avoiding frontal assaults, obvious lines of advance, and obvious objectives. In this classic study of strategy, B.H. He is a strong advocate of disrupting enemy communications, planning, and command structures by means of unanticipated lines of attack and unique distribution of forces. It is as relevant today as it was when Hart revised it. Rather interestingly, Hart implies that air force and naval operations although often incorporated in ground force strategic implementations are more usually integral to grand strategies than to military strategy. One can legitimately ask did Hart develop his concept of the indirect approach strategy from his analysis of history or did he develop the concept first and then used his study of history to prove it. He specifically focuses on military strategy to achieve military ground force goals.
This is recommended to anyone seeking even a minimum knowledge in military strategy. Strapped for time. Though I am not sold on Liddell Hart's thesis in this book, it provides such an expansive analysis of historical military accounts that I cannot discount its indelible mark on my future thoughts of military strategy. Clausewitz puts me to sleep, but Liddell Hart kept me awake into the wee hours of the morning. Read the introductory chapters and skip to the final chapters where Liddell Hart expounds upon his thesis (having spent the majority of the book providing countless analyses of historical examples).
You may read "The Art of War" for fundamentals, but you need to read this book for the execution. Small unit tactics driving whole world strategy. The first is its intended insight into what makes for successful strategy - "the indirect approach". The second is for the history of warfare over the some 3,000 years. This book can be enjoyed on two levels. Liddell Hart effectively outlined the situation the world finds itself in today. Unlike other similar book with similar topics, this one has had me going back to it over and over again. I bought this book to replace the one I'd had with me since I first bought in while in the Marine Corps.
But overall, a strategy book that is completely based on the stupidity of the enemy is quite weak, in my opinion. The main rules are "attack your opponent where he least expects", "trick your opponent so that he falling into your trap", and so on. I'd give it 2 stars as a modern strategy text, and 5+ stars as a practical advice for contemporary military leaders (but which is only of historical interest today). The author always assumes that you are smarter than your opponent.
Apparently, many times in history the enemy was easy to trick, due to stupidity, or arrogance, or political pressure.
For instance, it's no longer true that you always want to attack where the enemy least expects you (Nash's theory explains that issue on an abstact-theoretical level).
Some advice still holds; for instance, you should indeed attack in a way that threatens multiple enemy objectives, leaving the enemy guessing for as long as possible.
Famous generals from the Allies and Axis forces, as well as from post-war Israel, have successfully used and highly praised this book.
Furthermore many examples in the book are one-sided, usually blaming the losing side without truly explaining their choices and reasoning very well.
What if the enemy is just as smart as you are, or at least follows the advice from the same book.
Most of the book's recommendations are no longer valid in that case.
Nevertheless, the book's advice worked very well as recently as mid-20th century.
It's hard to rate this book.
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