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The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual |
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The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency.
The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.
An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard?s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine.
An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come.
The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America?s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Accessories
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Reviews
What makes the book interesting is that it tries to grapple with the application of military force by a modern liberal democracy under media scrutiny in the face of an international community and a home constituency that hold the (American) army to a higher standard of conduct than the enemy.
None of the great commanders of old, Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Djengis Kahn, none of them, had to accomplish their missions under these constraints. For them the solution of how to "win the hearts and minds" of the indigenous population was simple: Make the host nation fear you more than the insurgents! It would also be the advice of Machiavelli.
It is a really griping experience to see the great American military and political minds that lie behind this field manual grapple with the problem.
Unfortunately: Strip the manual of all its academic and army speak and the solution boils down to no better than: You must show the host nation that you can offer them a better life than the insurgents can.
This goes against the grain of all of the lessons found in modern behavioral finance psychology (Kahneman et al): We are motivated twice as much by the threat of loss than by the promise of reward. The insurgents have the advantage, because they can employ fear and the threat of torture and death.
I simply cannot see that this is a winnable strategy. I am not sure that you set yourself up for a winnable war under these conditions. The core of the recommendation is soaked in idealism where the psychological firepower of the opposition is by definition double that of the "Good Guys." But what to do if you are held to a different standard than your opposition - and under public scrutiny? Well, it seems like the advice given to Chrysler top management way back in the mid 90s: "The lesson of the movie, The Prefect Storm, is: You can only survive the perfect storm by being not there!" Don't get embroiled in a war where you will have to deal with insurgency. By the way, the Israeli's managed to eliminate suicide bombers by building wall between them and the Palestinians - against the most vociferous international and media opposition. Result: zero suicide bombings. A conventional solution in the face of opprobrium and hysteria from the leftwing intellectuals.
Finally, the authors should go back and reat Machiavelli for style and succinct expression. The Prince is valid and read after 500 years, this Field Manual won't be. And the style shields them from reality. Unfortuantely this book is not the answer to the problem.
Disappointing. Too many words to say "Be kind to the good guys." Doesn't say to first make sure they are the good guys. Reads like a social workers text. As soporific as a physics book. There must be a Cliff notes for the troops. At least it keeps administration diverted from military meddling. Not a keeper.
The only reason I'm writing this review is because you don't have to pay for this! It was written by employees of the government (i.e. paid for by U.S. tax dollars) and is available for free.
Yes, you can get a few more words in the form of an introduction, but the field manual is an unclassified government document. It's unlimited distribution is approved and the average citizen can find a copy just by searching the internet for "FM 3-24" - FM is an acronym for Field Manual.
One source is: [...]
As far as the text, I've had the opportunity to hear both GEN Petraeus and LTC (Ret.) John Nagl, major contributors to the manual, speak on the subject of counterinsurgency. If you want to read about the ideas behind the manual, it's largely based of David Galula's work titled "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice". Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era) is a major reprint. If you really want to pay for a text, I'd suggest purchasing that work.
Other reviewers have already made appropriate comments on the content of the manual. I'll just add that the manual itself is meant for military practical application at the operational and strategic levels; the audience is Soldiers and Marines. As such, some of the application may be foreign to "Average Joe".
If you're interested in this manual, I'd also suggest reading FM 3-24.2, "Tactics in Counterinsurgency", which was written for practical application at the tactical level.
This book is a good read and a solid reference as you read other military and war themed books. The approach that the military now uses is totally different that was used in earlier conflicts. The times are different, the enemy is different, the goals are different. This compact little manual helps you better understand why the U.S. Military does what it does and why. The saying "study history or you are doomed to repeat it" is one of many reasons this manual is so important. When the U.S. military went into Iraq we initially approached our efforts as we had in prior conflicts. The battlefields in Iraq were not the swamps of Vietnam, the beaches of Normandy or the jungles of Africa. There is a fair amount of history in the manual but it is necessary and an integral part of the book. This change. A book on typewriter repair wont help you repair your computer. The Army manuals of ten years ago were not nelpful in dealing with a brutal insurgency. This is a great read but a solid reference tool also.
This field manual presents a unique collaboration between the Army and Marine Corps in providing doctrine for dealing with counterinsurgency operations. It brings theory back to Clausewitz and away from Jomini, e.g. winning the political goals, not just the destruction of the enemy.
It is a well thought out and researched publication that should be read not only by the military, but by law enforcement. We need to keep the "big picture" in mind when we respond to terrorism, here or overseas.
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